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RECENT DECISIONS
IMPLIED INDEMNITY IN CALIFORNIA:
CAHILL BROS. v. CLEMENTINA CO. (CAL. 1962)
A subcontractor working at a construction site is negligent in
the performance of his duties, causing injury to a pedestrian. The
pedestrian brings an action against the general contractor, and recovers on the theory that because of the relationship between the
general contractor and the subcontractor the negligence of the latter
is imputed to the former. Does the general contractor have any right
to recover in full from the subcontractor for the judgment which he
satisfied?
This hypothetical situation must be distinguished from two
closely related situations which will not be discussed. First, since
the general contractor seeks full, not partial, recovery from his subcontractor, his right, if any, depends on the principles of indemnity
and not on the principles of contribution. Secondly, since there is no
express agreement of indemnity between the contractors, the general
contractor must depend on a right to indemnity which arises as a
matter of law, that is, a right to implied indemnity.'
While California only recently recognized the right to implied
indemnity, such right is now well established.2 Nevertheless, recognition of the right to implied indemnity has presented many problems
to the courts in determining what rules apply, and what circumstances give rise to a right to implied indemnity. Until CahillBrothers
Inc. v. Clementina Co.' no clear pattern appeared to be evolving. The
purpose of this article is to examine Cahill in light of the decisions
which preceded it.
THE PRIOR LAW

The four California cases in point decided before 1962" spoke
in terms of two theories supporting the right to implied indemnity.
1 PROSSER, TORTS § 46 (2d ed. 1955).
2 San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Maintenance Co.,
162 Cal. App. 2d 434, 328 P.2d 785 (1958). See also CAL. CODE CIy. PROC. 875 (f).
8 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1962).
4 City and County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d 802
(1958); Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy, 180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 4 Cal. Rptr. 379
(1960); De La Forest v. Yandle, 171 Cal. App. 2d 59, 340 P.2d 52 (1959); San

Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Maintenance Co., 162 Cal. App.
2d 434, 328 P.2d 785 (1958). For a detail analysis of these four cases and the
theories of indemnity applied to sustain recovery see 13 HASTINGS L.J. 214 (1961-62).
As this article aptly points out, the source of the problem is that the courts were
not clear in those cases as to what theory they were applying.
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The dominant theory is basically one in tort, derived from a Pennsylvania case, 5 which defined implied indemnity as follows:
The right of indemnity rests upon a difference between the primary
and the secondary liability of two persons each of whom is made
responsible by the law to an injured party. It is a right which inures
to a person who, without active fault on his own part, has been
compelled, by reason of some legal obligation, to pay damages occasioned by the initial negligence of another, and for which he
himself is only secondarily liable. 6

The other theory to which the courts have alluded is one founded
in contract which appears to have first been stated by the United
States Supreme Court in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic
Steamship Corp.7 There the Court said that where one who holds
himself out as an expert in his field accepts a job, he is impliedly
agreeing to perform his work in a safe and reasonable manner. It is
to
this failure to perform his work with safety, resulting in injury
8
a third person, which may give rise to a right of indemnity.
Three cases decided in 1962, before Cahill, illustrate the difficulty courts have had in determining which of these two theories
should apply in a given case. In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. KPIX
Westinghouse BroadcastingCo.9 an employee of defendant television
station was injured during a telecast originating from the plaintiff's
building. Plaintiff sought indemnity from the television station for
amounts paid to the employee in satisfaction of a judgment. The
trial court sustained a demurrer but was reversed on the ground that
there were California cases supporting such a cause of action. The
court cited the Ryan case, and the four earlier California decisions,
but failed to distinguish between the two theories, tort and contract.
Instead, the court said simply:
The complaint states a cause of action. It is based on the theory
of implied indemnity and arises out of the relationship of the parties,
their agreement, and the alleged negligent conduct on the part of the
defendant.' 0

Apparently, the court approved both theories as concurrently giving
rise to the right of recovery. However, the court failed to recognize
5 Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 368, 24 A.L.R.2d 319
(1951).

6 26 Cal. Jur. 2d Indemnity § 2 n.16 (1963 Supp.).
7 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
8 This theory was also recently applied in Curtis v. A. Garda y Cia, 85 A.L.R.2d
1186 (1959).
9 198 Cal. App. 2d 759, 18 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1962).
10 Id. at 761, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
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the clear distinction between the fact situation of at least one of
the cases cited" and the case before it.
In American Can Co. v. City and County of San Francisco2
plaintiff's employee had recovered against it in a previous action for
injuries sustained when a vehicle owned by plaintiff struck an improperly parked city truck. In the case cited, plaintiff's claim for
indemnity from defendant City and County was rejected. Plaintiff
attempted to recover on the basis of the distinction between primary
and secondary negligence, citing City and County of San Francisco
v. Ho Sing" and Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy 4 as support for
its contention. The court answered that plaintiff had misread those
cases, since both were decided on the basis of a special relationship
between the parties; that even though Alisal speaks in terms of primary and secondary negligence, it was not decided on that basis. The
distinction the court attempted to make goes to the heart of the
problem: The difference between primary and secondary negligence
is one in kind, arising out of the different duties owed, not one in
degree, as in the doctrine of comparative negligence, where both
parties owe the same duty to the injured party."' As the court
correctly points out it is the principle of comparative negligence on
which the plaintiff in American Can Co. would have to rely. Although
the court's reasoning was correct, it drew such reasoning from the
wrong case. As the court first said, the case before it was clearly
distinguishable from Alisal because of the contractual relationship
in the latter case. However, the confusion resulted because in Alisal
the court spoke of both theories concurrently." The court should
have distinguished only the Ho Sing case by its analysis of primary
and secondary liability, since in Ho Sing there was no contractual
relationship between the parties. 7
Pierce v. Diamond and Gardner Corp."8 similarly adds to the
11 City and County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d
802 (1958).

12 202 Cal. App. 2d 520, 21 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1962).
13 51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d 802 (1958).
14 180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 4 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1960).
15 Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 319 (1951).

16 The confusion arose because the Alisal case appears to adopt the rule of
primary and secondary liability citing from Builders Supply Co. In Builders Supply
the plaintiff sought indemnity on the basis that the defendants' auto caused plaintiff
to swerve into the path of an oncoming auto. Recovery was denied because
indemnity was said to rest upon the primary and secondary negligence of the two
persons and doesn't exist in the case of tortfeasors owing the same duty to the
injured party and having no legal relation to each other. The court however, in the
principal case had already distinguished Alisal and Ho Sing on the basis of the legal
relationships existing between the parties.
'7 205 Cal. App. 2d 264, 23 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1962).
'8 208 Cal. App. 2d 367 at 376, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301 at 306 (1962).
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confusion. There the corporation employed one Turner to cut timber.
Turner employed Pierce to do the work. Pierce negligently damaged
a home. The homeowners joined the corporation, Turner and
Pierce, recovered judgment from all three, but recovered payment
only from Pierce. Pierce sought contribution from Turner, who
resisted on the ground that he would have been entitled to indemnity
from Pierce. Pierce was allowed to recover on the theory that even
though he was primarily liable, Turner's negligent supervision
negated his claim of a right to indemnity. The court's reasoning
was internally consistent, but it considered the tort theory as the
only possible basis of indemnity. In dealing with the right of contribution, the court seems erroneously to have failed to recognized
the purely contractual relationship between the parties.
THE CAHILL CASE

Cahill was decided shortly after the above cases. Cahill hired
Clementina to perform a demolition job at one of Cahill's construction sites. Because the controlling shareholder of the Clementina
Co. was also the general superintendent for Cahill, both companies
were being supervised by the same person. In keeping with prior
practice, the contract between the parties was oral. As a result of
Clementina's failure to properly barricade the job a pedestrian was
injured when he fell into an excavation on the job site. A judgment
was recovered from both parties in a previous action, and Cahill
sought indemnification from Clementina. The court was faced with
the same question as in the prior cases: Is there a right to implied
indemnity here, and if so, on what principles is such a right based?
Recognizing the confusion that had arisen from the prior cases, the
court said:
It appears that the general rule as evolved from previous cases
is that the right of implied indemnity rests upon the difference
between the primary and secondary liability of two persons each of
whom is made responsible by the law to an injured party . . . . However, a close analysis of the cases discloses that where the right of
implied indemnity rests upon a contractual relationship between
the two parties it is not necessary or appropriate to apply the theories
of primary and secondary liability.19

Cahill makes it clear that the right of implied indemnity in
contractual cases is based upon a breach of contract by the person
against whom indemnity is sought. The contract has been breached,
and the resulting damages are subject to an agreement to indemnify
implied in the contract. The reasoning is basically that of the
19 Id. at 376, 25 Cal. Rptr. 308.
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Supreme Court in Ryan: Where the parties are bound by contract,
this contract necessarily implies an obligation to perform with safety
and to discharge foreseeable damages resulting from an improper
performance.
The court in Cahill classified that action as based on the theory
of "implied contractual indemnity" and said: "we are therefore not
concerned with the incidents of primary and secondary liability but
rather with the question as to whether Clementina breached a contractual duty to Cahill."2 The court in effect recognized the basis
for distinguishing Ho Sing and American Can Co., by stating that
in the area of noncontractual indemnity the right rests upon the fault
of another which has been imputed to or constructively fastened
upon the one seeking indemnity. In such a case the proper theory of
recovery is based on the "equitable considerations arising from the
distinction between primary and secondary negligence,"" rather
than on breach of contract.
CONCLUSION

The distinction made in Cahill between "contractual" and "noncontractual" implied indemnity is a valid one. The cases preceding
Cahill make it clear that the courts which have chosen the tort
theory have constantly been faced with the difficult task of determining what kind of imputed negligence will be called "secondary," and thus give rise to a right of indemnity against the real, or
"primary" tortfeasor. It is with great difficulty that the courts distinguish between primary and secondary liabilty. Under the tort
theory the court must evaluate the nature of the legal obligation
owed by each party to the person injured.
Under the rule of the Cahill case, the court first determines
whether the contractual relationship between the parties implies a
term that the defendant, the party against whom indemnity is
sought, will perform his part of the contract in a safe manner, and
will hold the other harmless against any liability that may arise from
his negligence. If this implied promise is breached, indemnity is
available, unless, as in Cahill, the party seeking indemnity has
actively participated in the negligent conduct. 2 The difference is
that the court need not examine the nature of the legal obligation, or
the reason for imputing liability to the party seeking indemnity. The
Ibid.
Id. at 378, 25 Cal. Rptr. 307.
22 Both Cahill and Pierce speak in terms of adequate supervision and control as
the elements to be considered in deciding whether the neglignce of the party seeking
indemnity is sufficient to deny him recovery.
20
21
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court simply looks to that party's actions, to determine whether by
his affirmative act he contributed to the injury. If he did, he is not
entitled to indemnity; if he did not, he may recover for breach of
the implied contract.
Of course, the tort theory of indemnity has not been invalidated
by the Cahill decision. If the parties are unrelated in any way, or
if their relationship is not such as to imply a contract of indemnity,
the tort theory may be relied upon. However, if there is such a relationship, Cahill has cleared the way to a much simpler action for
indemnity: the plaintiff must merely prove the relationship, that it is
the type from which a contract of indemnity will be inferred, and
that plaintiff did not by his affirmative act contribute to injury.
Under Cahill, there is no longer a need to explore the murky area
of "primary" and "secondary" negligence.
Edward M. Alvarez

TORTS: BUILDER'S LIABILITY TO THIRD
PARTY: SABELLA v. WISLER (CAL. 1963)
Wisler, an experienced home builder, constructed upon an
inadequately filled lot a house he intended to offer for sale to the
public. He negligently failed to inspect the soil upon which the
house was being built. Three years after the house was sold a
connecting sewer pipe began leaking, and within three months the
house began settling unevenly, causing substantial damage. The
leak was caused by either the settling of the inadequately filled
earth, improper installation of the sewer pipe by a subcontractor, or a combination of both. The buyer of the house (Sabella)
chose to ignore the vendor-purchaser relationship whereby Wisler's
liability would have been based upon implied warranty with its
attendant defense of caveat emptor, and predicated Wisler's liability solely upon negligence in construction of the house.1
The problem presented finds its basis in Winterbottom v.
Wright2 which held that an action in contract for breach of a duty
arising from a contract could only be maintained by a party thereto.
I Sabella v. Wisler, 59 A.C. 29, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
Although there was privity of contract between Wisler and Sabella it is not mentioned
in the decision because the privity existed only by considering Wisler in his capacity
as vendor. In effect, as a builder Wisler was in privity of contract with himself as
a vendor, and the court proceeded as if Wisler the Builder and Wisler the Vendor
were separate and distinct persons.
2 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
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This was interpreted to mean that an action in tort by a third party
was precluded. The flaw in this reasoning was recognized by some
courts, but it was not until MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.' that
the break-through came. This decision excepted from the Winterbottom doctrine products which, if defective, would be inherently
dangerous not only to the party in privity of contract with the manufacturer, but also to other foreseeable users. The duty of reasonable
care in manufacturing such a product therefore ran to all foreseeable users, and a breach thereof was actionable regardless of the
absence of privity of contract.' This latter rule was being followed
in California at least as early as 19325 and had been extended to
suppliers and repairers' of chattels.
But Winterbottom had yet to be qualified or repudiated when
applied to building contractors. Thus in Kolburn v. P. J.Walker
Co.7 the court held untenable the argument that a builder was liable
for personal injuries' to a person not in privity resulting from defective construction of a building which had been accepted by the
owner." However, such an argument began to receive recognition
as an exception. If the builder's work was so defective as to be
imminently dangerous to third persons, and he knew of the defect
whereas the owner did not and could not discover it by a reasonable
inspection, then the builder would be liable.'" Next, the "imminently
dangerous" requirement was abrogated, and reasonable certainty
of endangering third persons by the defect became the test." This
was the test in California up to 1957.12 In 1955, however, a federal
case had taken the lead and abolished the privity rule,' 3 thereby
providing support for the final blow to the privity doctrine in
California which came in Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co. 14 This case changed
the standard to that of reasonable care for the protection of anyone
who may foreseeably be endangered by the builder's negligence.
8 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
4 For a complete discussion, see PROSSER, TORTS § 84 (2d ed. 1955).
5 Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7 P.2d 1013 (1932).
6

Ibid.

7 38 Cal. App. 2d 545, 549-50, 101 P.2d 747, 748-49 (1940).
8 The builder's liability for other than a personal injury did
status of being untenable.
9 This discussion is limited to situations where the owner
building and the party seeking recovery from the builder is
contract with him (be it the owner himself or a third party).
10 Johnston v. Long, 56 Cal. App. 2d 834, 133 P.2d 409 (1943).

not even have the
has accepted the
not in privity of
See REsTATEMENT,

TORTS § 385 (1934).
11 Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948).
12 Freeman v. Mazzera, 150 Cal. App. 2d 61, 309 P.2d 510 (1957).

13 Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
tenant after landlord accepted the work.)
14 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958).

(Builder held liable to
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Sabella could not recover from the negligent builder for the
damage to his house under the law at this point. The cases thus
far have talked about personal injuries to persons not in privity
with the builder. Insofar as recovery for damage to such person's
property is concerned, whether it be the thing defectively built or
other property, the privity doctrine is still the law. 15 To trace the
evolution of case law by which the negligent builder came to be
held liable for damage to property, other streams of law must be
examined.
The California construction of the MacPherson rule in its
native habitat (automobile cases) allowed recovery for personal
injury or damage to other property but not for damage to the defective car itself. 16 The reasoning was that the manufacturer's tort
duty extended to exercising reasonable care to see that his product
was free from defects which would produce bodily injury or damage
to other property. On the other hand, his duty with respect to
his product is based on warranty, and any action taken for breach
thereof would necessarily sound in contract. Then a notary drafted
a defective will which deprived the intended beneficiary of most
of her inheritance.' 7 The California Supreme Court issued a sweeping policy statement which enabled the beneficiary to recover from
the notary although there was no privity:
Liability to a third party not in privity is a matter of policy and
depends on the extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect Plaintiff; foreseeability of harm to him; the degree of certainty
that he was harmed; close causal connection between Defendant's
act and the harm; moral blame attached to Defendant's conduct;
policy of preventing future harm.' 8

Furthermore, the risk involved and the damage incurred may be
to intangible property only.' 9
Fourteen days after this decision it was recognized in Fentress
v. Van Etta Motors2 ° that an automobile manufacturer could be
held liable in tort for damage to the automobile caused by a defect
but only if the defect arising from his negligence involved the automobile in some violent accident or a collision with an external object.
In view of these extraneous developments it would seem that
15 Of course, if the damage is as to the thing defectively built and there is
privity an action lies in contract for breach of warranty.
16 Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d 423, 302 P.2d 665 (1956).
17 Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
18 id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
19 Ibid.
20

157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (1958).
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Sabella might be able to recover under Biakanja v. Irving2' by
arguing that allowing recovery for damage to intangible property
necessarily implies allowing recovery for damage to tangible property. Sabella certainly could not recover under Fentress, since his
house was not involved in a violent accident or a collision with an
external object.
Soon thereafter Stewart v. Cox 22 provided a factual situation

which put all the foregoing developments to the test. A subcontractor
negligently installed gunite material in a swimming pool causing
water to escape which damaged the pool, the surrounding yard, and
the nearby house. Involved were all the factors which would have
prevented recovery at one time or another. First, Cox was a subcontractor not in privity of contract with the owners, and his work
had been accepted by the general contractor and the owners. 21 Second, the pool, even if defectively built, was not imminently dangerous to third persons to the knowledge of Cox; nor was it known
to be so by the non-negligent general contractor and the owners; 24
nor was it reasonably certain to place life or limb in peril.2 Third,
even by analogy to the automobile cases, still there was no violent
accident or collision with an external object.2 6 The court met the

challenge and adopted the sweeping policy statement in Biakanja,
took cognizance of all the cases mentioned (with the notable exception of the automobile cases), and found the subcontractor liable
for damage to the pool, yard, and house. This left open the objection that Fentress, by analogy, would require a violent accident or
collision with an external object when recovery was sought for
damage to the thing defectively built.
With this background Sabella recovered a judgment from
Wisler for the decrease in the market value of the house due to
Wisler's negligence. On appeal the court presented a decisive synthesis of the preceding cases and clarified the state of the law in
this field with welcome precision. First, it reiterated the policy
statement made in Biakanja and applied in Stewart, adding that
"the prevention of future negligent construction of buildings upon
insufficiently supportive material would not be furthered by exempting defendant Wisler from liability for his negligence. ' 27 Then it referred to Dow 21 to hold Wisler liable as a general contractor for
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P. 2d 16 (1958).
55 Cal. 2d 857, 362 P.2d 345, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1961).
Kolburn v. P. J. Walker Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 545, 101 P.2d 747 (1940).
ohnston v. Long, 56 Cal. App. 2d 834, 133 P.2d 409 (1943).
Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948).
Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (1958).
59 A.C. at 41, 377 P.2d at 893, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
In addition to the standard of care Dow is credited with imposing upon
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the possible29 negligence of the subcontractor in installing the sewer
pipe. Next, Stewart was employed to hold Wisler liable for damage
to the house itself, in spite of Wisler's contention that this was the
only foreseeable harm, whereas in Stewart damage to other property
was foreseeable (and when it was damaged this established the
breach of duty owed). The court pointed out, however, that recovery
in Stewart was allowed for damage to the pool as well.80 Finally
Wisler objected that the liability imposed upon him was contrary
to the holding in Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div." This was met
by holding both Wyatt and Fentress inconsistent with Stewart and
disapproved to the extent that they might be applied to builders as
distinguished from conventional manufacturers of goods. 2 The
court emphasized that all these problems had been resolved in
Stewart and made it clear that this was the law. The court concluded
its decision by indicating that liability will not be imposed in such a
case for other than substantial damage, as distinguished from a
petty grievance concerning, for example, a leaky faucet.
The rule imposing liability upon a builder in favor of a third
person not in privity, for the negligent performance of the builder's
contract, now can be clearly stated.8" The builder owes a duty of
reasonable care to anyone who may foreseeably be injured in his
person or property, whether such property be the thing negligently
built or merely within the scope of the risk created.
William H. Carney
builders (supra note 14) it was also held therein that a builder is in control of
construction and knows or should know what is being done and is primarily responsible to subsequent owners for a negligently created condition and the consequences that flow therefrom even though such conditions are created by a
subcontractor.
29 Recall that this or the inadequately filled earth or a combination of both
caused the damage, so that Wisler would be liable in any event.
30 Sabella v. Wisler, 59 A.C. at 41, 377 P. 2d at 893, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
81 145 Cal. App. 2d 423, 302 P.2d 665 (1956).
32 Sabella v. Wisler, 59 A.C. at 42, 377 P.2d at 894, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
88 But see Montijo v. Swift, 219 A.C.A. 416, 418 (August 14, 1963), wherein an
architect planned and supervised construction work as an independent contractor
and the court stated the rule governing his liability to a third person who was

injured from a defect in terms of a duty "to exercise reasonable care for the protection of any person who foreseeably and with reasonable certainty may be in-

jured," reverting back to the rule (in part, at least) of Hale v. Depaoli, see note 11
supra.

